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Abstract
This paper examines the influence of relative income position on individuals’ attitudes by
analyzing ISSP 1998 microdata from 25 countries along four different dimensions. Our
results provide evidence for a sizeable relative income effect while also suggesting that
absolute income level may be relevant. Changing the income reference group from regional
to national does not significantly alter the results.
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1. Introduction 
Envy,  a  “subtle  and  powerful  feeling,  motivating  everything  from  political  movements  to 
murders”  (Zeckhauser  1991,  p.  9),  plays  an  important  social  role  by  shaping  the  relations 
between human beings. Historically, envy has attracted much attention in both philosophy and 
social science. For example, as early as the third century BCE, Aristotle (1924) discusses envy in 
his Rhetoric, while Francis Bacon addresses it several centuries later in his ninth essay Of Envy 
(1890). Subsequently, Immanuel Kant (1964), in his Metaphysic of Morals, not only details the 
psychology of ingratitude and schadenfreude but provides a well-developed definition of envy 
and points to the importance of social comparisons. Other important philosophers, including 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, also stress the function of envy in human society. 
Economists, whose science originated from the field of moral philosophy, interpret envy 
primarily  through  the  phenomenon  of  positional  concerns  among  individuals.  For  example, 
Adam Smith (1759/1976) sees relative wants as central to human behavior, while Marx (1849) 
emphasizes that humans measure their wants and pleasure in relation to society. Even Marshall 
(1961),  often  seen  as  the  creator  of  modern  demand  theory,  notes  the  relevance  of  human 
distinction.  It  is  therefore  surprising that  many  economists  have  largely  neglected  the  topic, 
possibly  because  standard  utility  theory  assumes  that  individuals  evaluate  their  welfare  in 
absolute terms, whereas the theory of envy creation assumes that individual welfare depends on 
comparisons with others. Whatever the reason, there is a dearth of empirical research into the 
impact of relative income position on individual attitudes and behavior (see Senik 2005). Thus, 
this paper aims to provide further empirical evidence in this area.  
Specifically, this investigation focuses on the impact of relative income position on social 
capital. Since the notion of social capital encompasses multiple aspects, we present an analysis of 
four different measurements covering social norms, vertical and horizontal trust, and networks. 
Moreover, we expand the methodological framework used by empirical studies to date, virtually 
all of which, whether they  focus on income position’s effect on happiness (the majority) or  
health (a few), use cross-sectional data from one single country (Eibner and Evans 2004, 2005, 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Luttmer 2005, Mullahy, Robert and Wolfe 2004, Stutzer 2004, Easterlin 
2001, Clark and Oswald 1996). In contrast, we employ international survey data from the 1998 
wave  (RELIGION  II)  of  the  International  Social  Survey  Programme  (ISSP),  which  covers 
approximately  24,000  persons  in  25  countries.  In  addition,  because  the  survey  asks  many 
questions  related  to  various  aspects  of  social  capital,  the  dataset  allows  inclusion  of  a  very 
complete set of control variables to better isolate partial correlations between relative income 
position and social capital.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the four dimensions 
of social capital, after which Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the dataset 
and model, and Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Social Capital 
The concept of social capital, studied at length in many different disciplines, has been strongly 
influenced by political scientist Robert Putnam (2000). In addition, several economists use social 
capital  to  explain  economic  phenomena  (see,  e.g.  Knack  and  Keefer  1997,  Schaltegger  and 
Torgler  2005,  and  Slemrod  1998).  Thus,  social  capital  encompasses  multiple  aspects  (see 
Putnam  2001  and  Bjørnskov  2005),  of  which  this  paper  investigates  the  following  four   2 
dimensions: compliance with social norms, trust among people, confidence in state institutions, 
and the active creation of networks.  
The first dimension of social capital, compliance with social norms, is measured using a 
question related to tax morale, the intrinsic motivation or willingness to pay taxes, which many 
researchers  argue  helps  explain  unexpectedly  high  levels  of  tax  compliance  (see,  e.g.,  Alm, 
McClelland and Schulze 1992, Frey and Feld 2002, Torgler 2006a). We assess this dimension in 
line with previous studies (see Torgler 2005b, 2005c) using the following question from the ISSP 
1998: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her income 
in order to pay lower income taxes?” Thus, this social norm variable is a proxy for an ethical 
attitude in daily life. Second, we analyze two facets of the traditional social capital variable 
“trust” (see, e.g., Glaeser et al. 2000, Knack 2000, Uslaner 2002): trust among people and the 
people’s trust in national institutions. The first facet refers to generalized trust, the belief that 
most  people  can  be  trusted,  which  does  not  depend  on  a  specific  individual  or  on  group 
characteristics (see, e.g., Uslaner 2002). We measure it using the following question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing 
with people?” In a further step, we also address the particularized or institutional trust (in this 
case, the country’s lawmaking body) that is a key factor in measuring the vertical interaction 
between citizens and the state. To measure this dimension for Switzerland, we use the question: 
“How  much  confidence  do  you  have  in  the  [parliament]  <use  national  legislature,  e.g.  US 
Congress>?”  Finally,  we  measure  social  capital’s  networking  aspect  by  the  level  of  civic 
engagement in voluntary work like charitable activities (Putnam 2000) because, depite lack of 
empirical evidence (see Bjørnskov 2005), such engagement may generate positive externalities 
and thus more trust among and in people not formally part of such organizations; for example, 
strangers in the community (Putnam 2000).  
 
3. Hypotheses 
In  general,  if  people  care  about  their  relative  economic  position,  positional  concerns  should 
affect many different life facets at the attitudinal or behavioral level. Schoeck (1966) stresses that 
“throughout history, in all stages of cultural development, in most languages and as members of 
widely differing societies, men recognized a fundamental problem of their existence and have 
given it specific names: the feeling of envy and being envied” (p. 3). Thus, the perception of the 
relative  position  should  greatly  affect  people’s  morale.  As  a  result,  a  relative  economic 
disadvantage may lead to a lower willingness to pay taxes because of dissatisfaction and distress 
over the discrepancy between the actual and the aspired-to financial situation of a reference 
group. Thus, taxes might be perceived as a strong restriction, which increases the incentives to be 
less honest (for evidence, see Torgler 2006a, 2006b). Thus, our first hypothesis suggests that the 
willingness to pay taxes depends positively on the relative income position. 
However, individuals’ positional concerns or degree of envy may equally have a negative 
effect on their perceptions of others’ fairness and their trust in others. That is, their generalized 
trust could decrease due to frustration (“it could have or should have been me”) and a certain 
resignation of not being able to “keep up with the Joneses.” In consequence, feelings of envy 
may lead not only  to distrust of the Joneses (i.e., the  reference  group) but also of all other 
citizens. Thus, our second hypothesis suggests there is a negative correlation between positional 
concerns (disadvantage in the relative income position) and generalized trust.  
In  addition,  individuals  may  blame  the  state  or  its  institutions  for  the  relative  income 
disadvantages they experience compared to the Joneses. Thus, frustration or resignation may lead   3 
not only to a decrease in trust at the horizontal level (generalized trust) but also at the vertical 
level; that is, the relation between the government and the citizen, for which we use the politico-
economically linked variable “confidence in parliament.” Our resultant third hypothesis suggests 
that positional concerns lead to lower trust in state institutions like parliament.  
Lastly, we explore the possibility of a correlation between positional concerns and people’s 
willingness  to  contribute  to  society  through  participation  in  voluntary  organizations.  For 
example, individuals may become involved in such institutions intending to correct or deal with 
their  own  relative  social  disadvantages  through  charitable  activities  (e.g.,  helping  the  sick, 
elderly,  or  poor).  Accordingly,  we  develop  our  fourth  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  positive 
correlation between positional concerns and the active participation in charity organizations.  
 
4. Data and Model 
This analysis uses a cross section of individual data from the 1998 ISSP survey, which contains 
various questions related to our four dimensions of social capital. For each dimension, we choose 
one representative ISSP measure, which categorical variables are recoded so that higher values 
correspond to higher levels of social capital. 
It  is  important  to  our  analysis  that  this  dataset  not  only  covers  approximately  24,000 
observations from 25 countries but provides information on personal income, our variable of 
interest, and various  additional sociodemographic  variables  usually  employed  in  multivariate 
analyses of issues like tax morale, health status, or life satisfaction (see, e.g., Torgler 2006b and 
Dorn et al. 2005). To make income comparable across countries and persons, we calculate PPP-
adjusted equivalent income in U.S. dollars based on the World Penn Tables 6.1 (Heston et al. 
2002) and the modified OECD equivalence scale (Van Doorslaer and Masseria 2004). National 
average income we compute as the average of the personal equivalence income observed in one 
country,  and  analogously,  as  the  regional  average  income  for  regions.  If  fewer  than  30 
observations exist for one region, we form larger entities for statistical inference. We measure 
the subsistence income as 40 percent of the average income of a country or region, and both 
average and subsistence income serve as a benchmark. Relative income position (difference) is 
the difference between an individual’s income and the reference income (income) (see Tables I–
III of the Appendix for descriptive statistics). 
In this cross-sectional model, we regard the level of social capital (Yi) as a function of the 
relative or absolute income position of an individual (Zi),a vector of additional control variables 
(Vi) and an error term (εi).
1  
 
Yi = β1Zi + β2Vi + εi                                                          (1) 
 
To  ensure  comparability  of  the  estimation  results,  computation  for  the  various  regressands 
employs the identical set of control variables. Our variable of interest, relative income position 
(difference), is measured in four different ways: (1 & 2) the difference between an individual’s 
income and the national (subsistence) income (income) and (3 & 4) the difference between the 
individual’s income and the regional (subsistence) income (income). In general, using a regional 
or  national  reference  level  is  advantageous  in  that  it  is  exogenously  given  for  the  single 
                                                 
1 We are aware that cross-sections are subject to problems like endogeneity; however, using individual data has the 
advantage that at least the macrodeterminants are not influenced by the behavior of one single individual.   4 
individual. The nonlinearity of the effect of income on social capital is taken into account by the 




The regional factor takes into account that income levels are not equally distributed within 
countries  and  people  are  more  likely  to  compare  their  societal  position  with  that  of  close 
neighbors than with the rest of the world. The subsistence level as the benchmark income is 
expected to mirror the shape of a utility function,
5 while the average income seems intuitively 
more  appealing  for  social  comparison.  The  set  of  income  variables  allows  differentiation 
between  the  absolute  and  relative  income  hypothesis.  If  only  relative  income  matters,  the 
coefficient of the average or subsistence income should be zero. If absolute income matters, the 
coefficients of the reference group and the relative income should be both positive and identical. 
To test the relative income hypothesis against the absolute income hypothesis, we conduct a 
Wald-test  on  the  difference  between  the  two  relevant  coefficients  after  each  regression.  In 
addition, because the estimated coefficients do not indicate the magnitude of the effect, we also 
compute marginal effects for the highest level of social capital. (See Table 1 of the Appendix, for 
a complete list of the model variables).   
The model is estimated using a weighted ordered probit method, in which clustering at the 
regional or national level takes into account that the error terms for individuals living in the same 
country or region might be correlated because identical institutions and conditions are shared. 
Otherwise, the standard errors of the coefficients might be biased downward (Moulton 1990). 
The estimation results are weighted to ensure that they are representative of the corresponding 
national population.  
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Regional Average Income as a Benchmark of Comparison 
Table I and II report the empirical results for only the income variables. Figures I to IV in the 
Appendix illustrate the different impact of relative income when the predicted probabilities for 
the two highest categories of the four different social capital measures are plotted. Only the 
probability of charity engagement declines with a higher relative income.  
 
Compliance with social norms 
The  first  social  capital  dimension,  compliance  with  norms,  is  measured  by  tax  morale,  the 
respondent’s view of whether it is morally wrong to report income taxes incorrectly (see Table 
1).
6 The estimates indicate that overall regional income level has no impact on tax morale but the 
level of tax morale seemingly increases with the distance between the individual’s equivalent 
income and the regional subsistence level. In other words, the closer people’s own earnings are 
to the subsistence level, the more prone they are not to report income taxes correctly. This result 
is particularly noteworthy given that low income earners (people below the subsistence level) 
pay  lower  income  taxes;  in  consequence,  the  financial  gain  from  tax  evasion  is  greater  for 
taxpayers with a higher income . Thus, as predicted by our first hypothesis, envy and positional 
                                                 
2 d2pos = square term of difference if difference > 0 otherwise 0.  
3 d2neg = square term of difference if difference < 0, otherwise 0.  
4 For the use of squared income terms to capture nonlinearities, see Evans and Viscusi (1993). 
5 This concept assumes that positive utility levels are attached to income at least as high as the subsistence level, 
which is not necessarily the case for an income below this threshold.  
6 The wording of the related questions can be found in Table III of the Appendix.    5 
concerns  on  the  part  of  the  deprived  decreases  social  capital  in  the  form  of  tax  morale. 
Interestingly,  the  income  difference  apparently  exerts  a  considerable  marginal  effect  on  the 
highest tax morale (about 3.9 percentage points). The positive and weakly significant coefficient 
on the negative difference squared (d2neg) even suggests that marginal tax morale increases with 
relative  income  for  persons  below  the  subsistence  level.  Nonetheless,  because  the  Wald-test 
cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  of  equal  coefficients  for  both  the  subsistence  and  difference 
incomes,  the  absolute  income  hypothesis  cannot  be  completely  rejected.  Using  the  regional 
average income instead of the subsistence level produces fairly similar estimation outcomes. The 
sole  difference  is  that  the  coefficient  of  the  negative  distance  squared  (d2neg)  loses  its 
significance, whereas the negative coefficient of the positive distance squared (d2pos) becomes 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These estimates indicate that the propensity to 




The  second  regressand  relates  to  the  social  capital  dimension  of  generalized  trust,  which 
measures whether respondents believe that people can generally be trusted (see Table I). Even 
though regional average level does not appear decisive for the level of trust, trust does rise as 
relative income increases, which supports the impact of positional concerns. That is, the richer 
people are relative to their peers, the more they regard their environment as trustworthy. This 
finding supports our second hypothesis. Moreover, the marginal effects are not negligible, with 
1.8  percentage  points  for  the  highest  category.  Nonetheless,  the  Wald-test  on  the  income 
variables  again  fails  to  support  the  relative  income  hypothesis.  For  negative  differences  in 
income,  the  estimate  of  the  squared  term  reveals  an  increasing  marginal  trust,  whereas  for 
positive  differences,  the  estimate  indicates  a  decreasing  marginal  trust.  However,  when  the 
alternative income benchmark is used, both relative and absolute income become decisive and 
positive determinants of social trust. Notwithstanding, the Wald-tests’ support of the absolute 
income hypothesis contradicts the observed significances of the coefficients.  
 
Trust in state institutions 
The next dimension of social capital measures confidence in state institutions, specifically the 
parliament. The estimation results (see Table II) show that confidence in parliament is influenced 
by  neither  general  social  wealth  (regional  subsistence  income)  nor  an  individual’s  relative 
income position. A totally different picture is observable when the regional average income is 
used as the reference income: that is, the confidence in parliament clearly rises with regional 
income and also (weakly) with relative income position. Thus, persons with fewer positional 
concerns have  more trust  in institutions that  are  subject  to  political  business and re-election 
cycles than the relatively deprived. Nonetheless, the Wald-test on the income variables does not 
reject the absolute income hypothesis, which supports the subjective view that better institutions 
are  found  in  wealthier  nations.  Overall, contrary  to  our  third  hypothesis,  trust  in parliament 
appears to be driven by the absolute income level.  
 
Social networking 
The last regressand is linked to the social networks that form a decisive part of social capital (see 
Table II), measured here by the frequency of the interviewee’s voluntary participation in, for 
example, charitable activities. As the significant coefficient on the regional subsistence level   6 
indicates,  voluntary  work  in  charity  organizations  appears  to  increase  with  absolute  social 
wealth. On the other hand, the frequency of such activities decreases  with a rise in relative 
income position, with a considerable marginal effect (2.1 percentage points). The Wald-test on 
the two income variables supports the view that it is relative income position and not absolute 
individual income level that matters. Obviously, no detrimental effect of envy exists here; rather, 
as predicted by our fourth hypothesis, persons with a low or middle relative income position 
become socially active. 
Admittedly, those with higher income may face tighter time constraints; however, it might 
also be that persons with a relatively low income prefer to actively engage in a cooperative re-
distributive  equilibrium  activity  among  their  peers  rather  than  support  such  organizations 
financially.  In  addition,  for  this  dimension  of  social  capital,  we  observe  that  the  estimation 
results are comparable to those based on the regional average income. The only difference is that 
for  positive  income  distances,  the  propensity  to  become  socially  active  decreases  but  at  an 
increasing  rate.  In  conclusion,  relative  income  becomes  decisive  when  the  regional  average 
income is employed instead of the regional subsistence level.  
 
5.2 National Average Income as a Benchmark of Comparison 
By outlining the estimates for both the subsistence and average incomes measured at the national 
level, Tables III and IV illustrate the different results when the reference group is changed—that 
is, when the relative individual income position is measured with respect to the national rather 
than the regional situation. The following discussion focuses particularly on these differences, 
with the regional income as the income of comparison.  
As regards tax morale, we report qualitatively identical results for the income variables in 
all  four  models  except  for  a  10  percent  significance  level  for  the  d2pos  variable  when  the 
regional  average  income  is  used.  The  marginal  impacts  of  the  relative  income  position  are 
comparably large for all models, and the Wald-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis in any 
model.  
When the focus is the level of social trust among the country’s residents, the impact of the 
subsistence level and the relative income position variables are again virtually identical for both 
incomes. In addition, the marginal effects are quantitatively consistent, with a certain decline in 
the  average  income  impact  for  both  regional  and  national  cases  but  no  clear  tendency  for 
positional concerns to work more strongly in the regional than in the national context.  
In terms of trust in parliament, differences do emerge. We observe some changes in the 
significance levels but only for those at the 10 percent level. Most particularly, relative income 
position now seems to matter for both regional average income and national subsistence level but 
not for the other two cases. This result indicates that envy is weakly associated with a lower level 
of confidence in the legislating institution, which now supports our third hypothesis.  
Finally,  as  regards  frequency  of  participation  in  charitable  organizations,  the  income 
variables based on the national levels show exactly the same pattern and similar quantitative 
effects as those for the regional benchmark models. In addition, the size of the income impact is 
almost identical when the national level is employed 
 
6. Conclusion 
The importance of relative preferences is not a new concept. However, empirical evidence on the 
extent to which relative income position matters in different aspects of life is relatively rare.   7 
Moreover, most empirical studies to date focus on its impact on happiness. Thus, as Paldam 
(2000) correctly points out, social capital literature is a “new field, [but] suffering from a great 
lack of  good,  reliable  data.  Both  time  series  and  cross-country  evidence  are  missing.  In  the 
meantime much speculation is going on” (p. 649). In contrast, this current cross-sectional study 
uses the rich ISSP 1998 dataset for 25 countries and about 24,000 individuals to go beyond 
previous  studies  that,  by  focusing  on  a  single  country,  are  unable  to  abstract  the  impact  of 
cultural differences. Thus, our paper contributes to the social capital literature in general and the 
cross-sectional research in particular by (1) analyzing the impact of relative income position on 
social capital and (2) using the responses to different questions to measure social capital along 
four different dimensions: compliance with social norms, general trust between people, citizen 
trust in institutions, and voluntary activities. 
In general, we find empirical support for relative income position’s relevance for social 
capital.  In  most  cases,  we  observe  that  the  coefficients  measuring  an  interviewee’s  relative 
income  position  are  statistically  significant  with  considerable  marginal  effects.  For  the 
generalized trust measure, social capital rises with relative income or, in other words, declines 
with growing envy. One exception, however, is confidence in parliament, at least in some of the 
model specifications. The social capital measure most strongly affected quantitatively by the 
relative  income  position  is  tax  morale.  As  regards  individual  participation  in  charity 
organizations, in the presence of an income disadvantage (compared to the reference income), 
the effect of relative income position becomes more prominent together with stronger social 
involvement.  
For most models, it is impossible to completely reject either the relative or the absolute 
income hypothesis. Moreover, in many cases, we find evidence that the relative income effect is 
not symmetrical; but shows the tendency of decreasing marginal utility for incomes above the 
reference  level.  Most  surprisingly,  the  majority  of  findings  are  fairly  robust  to  a  change  in 
reference groups—national versus regional or subsistence versus average income level. Only the 
marginal impacts of the positional variable appear more sizeable when the subsistence income 
serves as the reference income.  
   8 
Appendix 
 
Table I: Description of control variables and summary statistics 








Difference to subsistence 
income / 10000  23969  0.228  0.548  −0.706  6.980  See above 
Difference squared  
if income < 0  23969  0.001  0.011  0.000  0.498  See above 
Difference squared  
if income > 0  23969  0.352  1.384  0.000  48.720  See above 
Regional average income / 
10000  23969  0.151  0.259  0.000  0.785  See above 
Difference to average 
income / 10000  23969  0.228  0.552  −0.697  6.962  See above 
Difference squared  
if income < 0  23969  0.001  0.010  0.000  0.486  See above 
Difference squared  
if income > 0  23969  0.355  1.403  0.000  48.471  See above 
National subsistence 
income / 10000  23969  0.378  0.652  0.000  2.234  See above 
Difference to subsistence 
income /10000 income  23969  0.001  0.383  −1.995  5.912  See above 
Difference squared  
if income < 0  23969  0.055  0.229  0.000  3.978  See above 
Difference squared  
if Income > 0  23969  0.092  0.619  0.000  34.947  See above 
National average income / 
10000  23969  0.378  0.648  0.000  1.963  See above 
Difference to average 
income / 10000  23969  0.001  0.390  −1.792  5.867  See above 
Difference squared  
if income < 0  23969  0.056  0.226  0.000  3.213  See above 
Difference squared  
if income > 0  23969  0.096  0.641  0.000  34.420  See above 
             
Female  23969  0.529  0.499  0  1  V200 
Age 30–39  23969  0.220  0.414  0  1  V201 
Age 40–49  23969  0.198  0.398  0  1  V201 
Age 50–59  23969  0.161  0.367  0  1  V201 
Age 60–69  23969  0.139  0.346  0  1  V201 
Age 70–79  23969  0.080  0.272  0  1  V201 
Age 80  23969  0.014  0.117  0  1  V201   9 
 
Table I (cont.): Description of control variables and summary statistics 
Level of education  23969  4.584  1.460  1  7  V205 
Level of education 
squared  23969  23.143  13.580  1  49 
V205 
Single  23969  0.189  0.391  0  1  V202 
Separated or divorced  23969  0.075  0.264  0  1  V202 
Widowed  23969  0.086  0.280  0  1  V202 
Attendance at relig. 
services  23969  2.325  2.015  1  9 
V59 
Catholic  23969  0.414  0.493  0  1  V217 
Jewish  23969  0.031  0.174  0  1  V217 
Protestant  23969  0.202  0.402  0  1  V217 
Orthodox  23969  0.060  0.237  0  1  V217 
No religion  23969  0.234  0.423  0  1  V217 
Buddhist  23969  0.015  0.123  0  1  V217 
Muslim  23969  0.011  0.104  0  1  V217 
Urban  23969  0.486  0.500  0  1 
Community 
variables 
Rural area  23969  0.279  0.449  0  1  See above 
Self-employed  23969  0.093  0.291  0  1  V206 
Unemployed  23969  0.054  0.226  0  1  V206 
Retired  23969  0.194  0.395  0  1  V206 
Housewife  23969  0.100  0.300  0  1  V206 
Disabled  23969  0.021  0.144  0  1  V206 
Out of labor force  23969  0.010  0.102  0  1  V206 
Germanic languages  23969  0.183  0.387  0  1  V3 
Romance languages  23969  0.219  0.414  0  1  V3 
Northern Germanic lang.  23969  0.124  0.329  0  1  V3 
Balto-Slavic countries  23969  0.297  0.457  0  1  V3 
Other, non-English lang.  23969  0.120  0.324  0  1  V3 
Table is based on the number of observations in the tax morale regression model. 
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Table II: Description of dependent variables and summary statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max. 
VWS 
variables 
Happiness  24’166  2.8995  0.7370  1  4  V4   
Generalized trust  24’290  2.2681  0.8022  1  4  V19 
Confidence in parliament  23’690  2.4466  1.4098  1  5  V20 
Tax morale  23’969  2.9641  0.9445  1  4  V16 
Voluntary charity engagement  24’396  1.4560  0.9049  1  4  V33 
 
 
Table III: Wording of the ISSP questions for the social capital measures 
Measure  Question 
Happiness 
“If you were to consider your life in general these days, how 
happy  or  unhappy  would  you  say  you  are,  on  the  whole?” 
Possible  answers:  “very  happy,”  fairly  happy,”  not  very 
happy,” or “not at all happy.” 
Generalized trust 
“Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted 
or  that  you  can’t  be  too  careful  in  dealing  with  people?” 
Possible  answers:  “people  can  almost  always  be  trusted,” 
“people  can  usually  be  trusted,”  “you  usually  can’t  be  too 
careful in dealing with people,” or “you almost always can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people.”  
Confidence in parliament 
“How much confidence do you have in parliament?” Possible 
answers:  “complete  confidence,”  “some  confidence,”  “very 
little confidence,” or “no confidence.”  
Tax morale 
“Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a tax payer does not 
report all of [his/her] income in order to pay less income tax?” 
Possible answers: “not wrong,” “a bit wrong,” “wrong,” and 
“seriously wrong.”  
Voluntary charity engagement 
“Have you done any voluntary activity in the last 12 months in 
any of the following areas? Voluntary activity is unpaid work, 
not just belonging to an organization or group. It should be of 
service or benefit of other people or the community and not 
only  to  one’s  family  or  personal  friends.  During  the last  12 
months,  did  you do volunteer  work in  any  of  the  following 
areas:  …charitable  activities  (helping  the  sick,  elderly,  poor 
etc.)?” Possible answers: “no,” “yes, once or twice,” “yes, 3–5 
times,” or “yes, 6 or more times.”  
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Table III: Descriptive statistics for the 25 countries included 
Country  Freq.  Percent  Germanic  Romance  Northern-Ger.  Balto-Slavic  Other 
Germany  1405  5.86  1  0  0  0  0 
Austria  646  2.70  1  0  0  0  0 
Hungary  811  3.38  0  0  0  1  0 
Italy  591  2.47  0  1  0  0  0 
Netherlands  1419  5.92  1  0  0  0  0 
Norway  1259  5.25  0  0  1  0  0 
Sweden  857  3.58  0  0  1  0  0 
Czech Republic  693  2.89  0  0  0  1  0 
Slovenia  693  2.89  0  0  0  1  0 
Poland  901  3.76  0  0  0  1  0 
Bulgaria  920  3.84  0  0  0  1  0 
Russia  1009  4.21  0  0  0  1  0 
New Zealand  773  3.22  0  0  0  0  0 
Canada  610  2.54  0  0  0  0  0 
Philippines  1058  4.41  0  0  0  0  1 
Israel  830  3.46  0  0  0  0  1 
Japan  978  4.08  0  0  0  0  1 
Spain  1522  6.35  0  1  0  0  0 
Latvia  994  4.15  0  0  0  1  0 
Slovak Republic  1099  4.59  0  0  0  1  0 
France  865  3.61  0  1  0  0  0 
Portugal  1075  4.48  0  1  0  0  0 
Chile  1194  4.98  0  1  0  0  0 
Denmark  854  3.56  0  0  1  0  0 
Switzerland  913  3.81  1  0  0  0  0 
Total  24,166  100           
Number of countries and observations based on the tax morale regression model. 
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Tables 
 
Table I: Regional income as a benchmark for social comparison 
  Tax morale  Generalized trust 
  Subsistence income  Average income  Subsistence income  Average income 
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
income  0.003  0.001  0.048  0.018  0.084  0.006  0.128**  0.010 
  (0.03)    (1.49)    (0.90)    (3.78)   
difference  0.107*  0.039  0.117**  0.043  0.242**  0.018  0.144**  0.011 
  (2.56)    (3.45)    (4.12)    (2.75)   
d2neg  0.741(*)  0.270  0.067  0.024  1.605(*)  0.120  0.032  0.002 
  (1.71)    (1.55)    (1.69)    (0.45)   
d2pos  −0.014  -0.005  −0.027(*)  −0.010  −0.057**  -0.004  −0.055(*)  −0.004 
  (1.10)    (1.67)    (3.01)    (1.84)   
Observations  23969    23969    24290    24290   
Wald-test  









2   0.3529    0.1410    0.2322    0.8140   
Pseudo R
2  0.0216    0.0217    0.0623    0.0621   
Weighted ordered probit regression with clustering by regions. Marginal effects calculated at the 
averages for the highest category. Absolute value of the z-statistics in parentheses. **, *, and (*) 
denote significances at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table II: Regional income as a benchmark for social comparison 
  Confidence in parliament  Voluntary work for charity organizations 
  Subsistence income  Average income 
Subsistence 
income  Average income 
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
income  0.036  0.010  0.044**  0.012  0.607**  0.076  0.164*  0.021 
  (0.57)    (2.68)    (3.02)    (2.08)   
difference  0.078  0.021  0.062(*)  0.017  -0.164*  −0.021  −0.221**  -0.028 
  (1.54)    (1.72)    (2.21)    (3.66)   
D2neg  0.716  0.190  0.034  0.009  -1.784  -0.223  -0.111  -0.014 
  (1.03)    (0.60)    (1.31)    (1.03)   
D2pos  −0.017  −0.005  -0.022  −0.006  0.026  0.003  0.088**  0.011 
  (1.15)    (1.34)    (1.02)    (3.44)   
Observations  23690    23690    24396    24396   
Wald-test  
(income var.)  0.15 
 
0.16    10.90** 
 
14.03**   
Prob. > chi
2   0.6970    0.6850    0.0010    0.0002   
Pseudo R
2  0.0056    0.0056    0.0565    0.0568   
Weighted ordered probit regression with clustering by regions. Marginal effects calculated at the 
averages for the highest category. Absolute value of the z-statistics in parentheses. **, *, and (*) 
denote significances at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   16 
 
Table III: National income as a benchmark for social comparison 
  Tax morale  Generalized trust 
  Subsistence income  Average income  Subsistence income  Average income 
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff 
income  -0.014  -0.005  0.046  0.017  0.058  0.004  0.131**  0.010 
  (0.15)    (1.40)    (0.61)    (3.79)   
difference  0.119**  0.044  0.121**  0.044  0.259**  0.019  0.131*  0.010 
  (2.93)    (3.34)    (4.46)    (2.45)   
D2neg  0.986*  0.360  0.067  0.024  1.791(*)  0.133  −0.009  -0.001 
  (2.17)    (1.33)    (1.80)    (0.12)   
D2pos  −0.017  −0.006  -0.028  −0.010  −0.061**  −0.005  −0.051(*)  −0.004 
  (1.37)    (1.60)    (3.27)    (1.80)   
Observations  23969    23969    24290    24290   
Wald-test  
(income var.)  1.33 
 
2.22    2.29    0.00 
 
Prob. > chi
2   0.2479    0.1364    0.1306    0.9992   
Pseudo R
2  0.0217    0.0217    0.0623    0.0621   
Weighted ordered probit regression with clustering by countries. Marginal effects calculated at the 
averages for the highest category. Absolute value of the z-statistics in parentheses. **, *, and (*) 
denote significances at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table IV: National income as a benchmark for social comparison 
  Confidence in parliament  Voluntary work for charity organizations 
  Subsistence income  Average income  Subsistence income  Average income 
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
income  0.022  0.006  0.048**  0.013  0.681**  0.085  0.179*  0.022 
  (0.35)    (2.75)    (3.53)    (2.31)   
difference  0.093(*)  0.025  0.058  0.015  −0.195**  −0.024  −0.218**  -0.027 
  (1.89)    (1.47)    (2.80)    (3.73)   
D2neg  1.042(*)  0.277  0.013  0.004  −2.143  −0.268  −0.094  -0.012 
  (1.92)    (0.20)    (1.49)    (0.97)   
D2pos  −0.021  −0.006  −0.024  −0.006  0.033  0.004  0.082**  0.010 
  (1.42)    −1.36    (1.42)    (3.37)   
Observations  23690    23690    24396    24396   
Wald-test  




15.48**   
Prob. > chi
2   0.5015    0.8392    0.0001    0.0001   
Pseudo R
2  0.0056    0.0058    0.0569    0.0571   
Weighted ordered probit regression with clustering by countries. Marginal effects calculated at the 
averages for the highest category. Absolute value of the z-statistics in parentheses. **, *, and (*) 
denote significances at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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